Category: Haiti

The Evolving Fight To Contain Gangs in Port-au-Prince

June 14, 2025 / Ben Stubenberg / 0 Comments

In a desperate attempt to stave off complete gang takeover of Port-au-Prince, the Interim Haitian Government has contracted with private foreign security forces. These well-armed, occasionally well-trained, and often reckless hired guns are supposed to support the Haitian National Police and Army. But it is unlikely they will be able to contain the gangs or save the government’s tenuous toe-hold on less than 10% of the capital. The foreign private security forces may actually exacerbate the problem.

The most recent addition to the private security providers is Erik Prince, founder of the notorious Blackwater Worldwide private military contracting company that massacred 17 civilians in Iraq in 2007. Blackwater was dissolved, but rebranded itself under a new company, Constellis, offering similar services.

According to the New York Times, Mr. Prince is sending 150 “mercenaries” to Haiti. The dollar amount for the contract is not known, but it is likely in the tens of millions in order to pay the mercenaries and their equipment for their stint in Port-au-Prince, as well as ensure a healthy profit for the company. One can only surmise, but the mercenaries may be earning as much as $100,000 for a year on the job.

Compare that to the roughly $200 per month or $2400 per year that the Haitian National Police officers are receiving to put themselves on the line and face death every day. The roughly 400 Haitian Army soldiers deployed in the capital and facing the same dangers receive even less pay. That huge disparity for essentially the same work can only have a demoralizing effect on the Police and Army.

Both Haitian security forces and foreign contract security forces are using drones in an effort to target gang leaders. So far, they have not been successful, but innocent civilians have been killed in the process. If the foreigners kill innocent Haitians through drone attacks (or firefights), gangs will almost certainly use the casualties as propaganda to frame their struggle as a national liberation from foreign invaders to gain popular support. In any case, there will be little accountability for the actions of the mercenaries.

Meanwhile, the gangs themselves have attempted to purchase their own drones, most recently through the Dominican Republic. The DR has long served as a pipeline for arms to gangs in Haiti despite DR government efforts to stem the trade. Should the gangs in Port-au-Prince actually obtain drones and deploy them against Haitian police, army and foreign mercenaries, it will be a game changer and further redefine the nature of modern armed conflict, as it has in other parts of the world.

Some private security firms, including Mr. Prince’s, have reportedly attempted to hire Haitian-American military veterans to go to Haiti as security contractors/mercenaries to enhance familiarity with Haitian language and culture. But many Haitians with military skills have resisted being drawn in because they don’t want to be linked with notorious foreign mercenaries who are not welcomed and largely unaware of fast moving developments in Haiti. If anyone understands what’s going on with the gangs in Port-au-Prince, it’s the Haitian National Police and Army who face off with them almost every day.

Regardless, the mercenaries, along with the Kenyan and Jamaican troops currently deployed, won’t be enough to defeat the gangs, especially if the gangs are able to employ attack drones against them. The gangs already possess powerful assault weapons that match what their opponents have.

The foreign private security companies will certainly make a lot of money from their mercenary services regardless of how the tide of the conflict swings. And, once again, Haiti will become a place for foreigners to generate cash off of Haiti’s misfortune.

What’s Next For Port-au-Prince?

May 23, 2025 / Ben Stubenberg / 0 Comments

As the gang alliance, Viv Ansanm, threatens the last remaining sections of Port-au-Prince still under government control, we need to ask: What will a complete takeover look like? From this Haiti observer’s perspective, we are likely to see criminal city-state emerge. What I have called a “gangocracy”—the rule by gangs. Here’s how it could go down.

—Gangs take over and destroy Digicel facility in Port-au-Prince. This disrupts communications for 3.7 million people. Natcom Mobile, the other major provider, might still function for 4 million people. But almost half the population would be affected. The sharply reduced service would not affect most gangs since they are connected with Starlink.

—The remaining Interim Government of Haiti officials still in the city leave by helicopter and set up offices in Cap-Haitien, which has already become the de facto capital of Haiti. Indeed, government officials have been frequenting Cap-Haitien for months now (as well as cities in the south like Les Cay). Fortunately, the officials can use a helicopter operated by the Taiwanese that has been ferrying them back and forth from the capital. So everyone knows the route, even as shots are taken at the helicopter.

—Morale of the National Haitian Police at various stations around Port-au-Prince will fall. They will question why they are the only ones left behind to fend for themselves.

—As gangs tighten the noose around Port-au-Prince, they will lay siege to police stations and maybe attack them. The police may hold off for a while, but then, perhaps after a shoot-our, surrender with terms that could allow them to drive away freely and safely from the city with their families.

—The Kenyan and other foreign troops will have no incentive to fight and leave after negotiating some deal for safe passage. A UN plane would be deployed to pick them up at the airport (opened for this short window) and fly them to the US or another Caribbean nation or even back to Kenya.

How Will Foreign Countries React?

The spectacle of complete gang dominance will be humiliating. People will be asking, how could a ragtag band of gangs (albeit well-armed) kick out police as well as professional soldiers (also well-armed)? There will be a lot of fretting among foreign government officials about what to do next. One option being discussed is having the Organization of American States (OAS) put together a foreign military mission to try to confront and dislodge the gangs from Port-au-Prince. The reason to go through OAS is to avoid calling for a vote in the UN for more forces, which would likely be vetoed by Russia and China. Plus, OAS is not set up for armed force deployment. So this to won’t materialize.

In short, little appetite for another foreign intervention, which will leave the gangs in power.

Gangocracy Governance?

The international inaction will give the gangs a clear victory and put them in control of the capital. But the gangs have not put forth a plan for governing. In fact, it seems they have little interest in setting up a government.

Rather, they would prefer to exert power and influence through intimidation, while also using the opportunity to amass more money and arms to remain in control. They will want everyone to know that they call the shots. In other words, it’s a giant ego trip. In fact, the leader the gang “5 Segon,” Johnson Andre, aka “Izo,” fancied himself as a rap star. He often posted video on TikTok until his account was shut down. Other gang leaders enjoy showing off their cash on TikTok.

The lack of ambition beyond wealth and personal power could lead to an opulent lifestyle where gang leaders and their lieutenants take advantage of abandoned villas in and around Port-au-Prince. The gangs would likely play to the common people by branding themselves as the ones who defeated the foreign invaders and liberated the city. They might allow back some foreign medical teams to restart clinics and aid agencies to ship in food, as hunger is becoming acute with the prospect of famine. Down the road, gangs may even seek some recognition and legitimacy as a power to be reckoned with. But only if they can keep the loose alliance going.

Complete gang take-over also opens the door to narco-traffickers seeking to expand using a safe base. In that sense, control of the capital can further enhance the wealth of gang leaders and entrench their power. At that point, the city-state gangocracy will be complete and serve as an entity that defies the rules of diplomacy and the concept of the nation-state.

Of course, there is also the possibility that the alliance will collapse and the gangs fight among themselves over turf, especially if there is not common enemy. That would, of course, only deepen the suffering of the people left behind in Port-au-Prince. The disease and famine triggered by a war among the gangs could well be catastrophic with little relief from aid agencies.

A Bigger Army for Haiti

October 5, 2024 / Ben Stubenberg / 0 Comments

Making the Case for Building Up the Haitian Army to Fight The Gangs

With the brutal gang killing of 70 people in the Artibonite Valley 50 miles north of Port-au-Prince last week, it is clear the security situation in the capital region is worsening. According to the UN Human Rights report, the “Gran Grif” gang used automatic weapons in a shoot-out with police and others that also killed 10 women and 3 infants. This horrific event unfortunately reveals the ineffectiveness of the foreign troops in Port-au-Prince (mainly the 400 Kenyan soldiers) to reduce the violence. Indeed, it shows that the UN and foreign governments are going about it wrong, and that a different solution is required.

The quality of the Kenyan troops (or the troops from Jamaica and other countries) is not at issue. Nor is there any want for logistics. The Kenyans are well-armed and live in high quality and very comfortable American-provided barracks near the Port-au-Prince airport. The problem, to state the obvious, is that the Kenyans are not Haitian. And because of that, they have no knowledge of the local culture, perceptions, or environment, and little understanding of the nature of gangs in Port-au-Prince. Moreover, the foreign troops generally don’t have much incentive to engage gangs who are armed with the same firepower, quite entrenched, and experienced in shootouts with police.

In past blogs I have noted how some gangs, despite their brutality, have become more effective in co-opting the local population with food, medicine and security. This, of course, is making gang eradication even more difficult, especially since the gang leaders frame the conflict as “us” Haitians against the foreign invaders.

Indeed, the foreign troops do not have the broad confidence of the Haitian population, whether or not in gang controlled areas, and therefore will receive little if any support. The whole idea of bringing in foreign troops comes with a familiar whiff of the foreign presumption that “we” can best handle this best, not the Haitians. That one-dimensional and shortsighted approach has always failed, as it did in the previous UN peacekeeping mission (known as MINUSTAH) that spent 13 years (2004 – 2017) trying to stabilize Haiti.

The only realistic alternative is to greatly expand the Haitian Army (Forces Armées d’Haiti or FAd’H). The Haitian Army currently has less than 2000 personnel. That number needs to be significantly increased to around 10,000 to be effective. Many potential and highly motivated recruits stand ready to join. If the UN or the U.S. and other nations really want to be part of the solution, they can help to train and equip those troops and even create an elite force among them. In time, Haiti could have a first rate military that, together with the Haitian National Police, could quash gangs and garner internal pride and respect.

Now, is there a risk that someday the military will stage a coup and install a ruthless military dictatorship (as happened in 1991)? Of course, but that risk is present in just about every developing country and even some developed countries around the world. The potential benefits of stabilization and security far outweigh the risk of a coup d’etat. This is the time to be bold and not let unknowable possibilities hold back a good chance to achieve order in Haiti.

Until Haiti develops a strong military capability, none of the other pressing issues in Haiti can be effectively addressed: health care, economic and infrastructure development, restoration of a justice system, and holding secure elections. All of these problems will continue to linger, including the displacement of 700,000 people due to gang violence. And when people feel safer and more protected , they will have less of a reason to flee Haiti and more of an incentive to stay and rebuild the country.

A strong Haitian army could also work with fire and rescue units to better prepare Haiti for natural disasters and play a key role in recovery after disasters strike. A Haitian army could be deployed to stem drug and gun trafficking through Haiti.

In short, a larger, better-equipped, and well-trained army is the only realistic option to give Haiti the best chance. Outsiders can give Haiti that chance, not by trying to fix things themselves, but by recognizing that Haitians can take care of their own problems better and lending them a hand.