Making the Case for Building Up the Haitian Army to Fight The Gangs

With the brutal gang killing of 70 people in the Artibonite Valley 50 miles north of Port-au-Prince last week, it is clear the security situation in the capital region is worsening. According to the UN Human Rights report, the “Gran Grif” gang used automatic weapons in a shoot-out with police and others that also killed 10 women and 3 infants. This horrific event unfortunately reveals the ineffectiveness of the foreign troops in Port-au-Prince (mainly the 400 Kenyan soldiers) to reduce the violence. Indeed, it shows that the UN and foreign governments are going about it wrong, and that a different solution is required.

The quality of the Kenyan troops (or the troops from Jamaica and other countries) is not at issue. Nor is there any want for logistics. The Kenyans are well-armed and live in high quality and very comfortable American-provided barracks near the Port-au-Prince airport. The problem, to state the obvious, is that the Kenyans are not Haitian. And because of that, they have no knowledge of the local culture, perceptions, or environment, and little understanding of the nature of gangs in Port-au-Prince. Moreover, the foreign troops generally don’t have much incentive to engage gangs who are armed with the same firepower, quite entrenched, and experienced in shootouts with police.

In past blogs I have noted how some gangs, despite their brutality, have become more effective in co-opting the local population with food, medicine and security. This, of course, is making gang eradication even more difficult, especially since the gang leaders frame the conflict as “us” Haitians against the foreign invaders.

Indeed, the foreign troops do not have the broad confidence of the Haitian population, whether or not in gang controlled areas, and therefore will receive little if any support. The whole idea of bringing in foreign troops comes with a familiar whiff of the foreign presumption that “we” can best handle this best, not the Haitians. That one-dimensional and shortsighted approach has always failed, as it did in the previous UN peacekeeping mission (known as MINUSTAH) that spent 13 years (2004 – 2017) trying to stabilize Haiti.

The only realistic alternative is to greatly expand the Haitian Army (Forces Armées d’Haiti or FAd’H). The Haitian Army currently has less than 2000 personnel. That number needs to be significantly increased to around 10,000 to be effective. Many potential and highly motivated recruits stand ready to join. If the UN or the U.S. and other nations really want to be part of the solution, they can help to train and equip those troops and even create an elite force among them. In time, Haiti could have a first rate military that, together with the Haitian National Police, could quash gangs and garner internal pride and respect.

Now, is there a risk that someday the military will stage a coup and install a ruthless military dictatorship (as happened in 1991)? Of course, but that risk is present in just about every developing country and even some developed countries around the world. The potential benefits of stabilization and security far outweigh the risk of a coup d’etat. This is the time to be bold and not let unknowable possibilities hold back a good chance to achieve order in Haiti.

Until Haiti develops a strong military capability, none of the other pressing issues in Haiti can be effectively addressed: health care, economic and infrastructure development, restoration of a justice system, and holding secure elections. All of these problems will continue to linger, including the displacement of 700,000 people due to gang violence. And when people feel safer and more protected , they will have less of a reason to flee Haiti and more of an incentive to stay and rebuild the country.

A strong Haitian army could also work with fire and rescue units to better prepare Haiti for natural disasters and play a key role in recovery after disasters strike. A Haitian army could be deployed to stem drug and gun trafficking through Haiti.

In short, a larger, better-equipped, and well-trained army is the only realistic option to give Haiti the best chance. Outsiders can give Haiti that chance, not by trying to fix things themselves, but by recognizing that Haitians can take care of their own problems better and lending them a hand.