In a desperate attempt to stave off complete gang takeover of Port-au-Prince, the Interim Haitian Government has contracted with private foreign security forces. These well-armed, occasionally well-trained, and often reckless hired guns are supposed to support the Haitian National Police and Army. But it is unlikely they will be able to contain the gangs or save the government’s tenuous toe-hold on less than 10% of the capital. The foreign private security forces may actually exacerbate the problem.
The most recent addition to the private security providers is Erik Prince, founder of the notorious Blackwater Worldwide private military contracting company that massacred 17 civilians in Iraq in 2007. Blackwater was dissolved, but rebranded itself under a new company, Constellis, offering similar services.
According to the New York Times, Mr. Prince is sending 150 “mercenaries” to Haiti. The dollar amount for the contract is not known, but it is likely in the tens of millions in order to pay the mercenaries and their equipment for their stint in Port-au-Prince, as well as ensure a healthy profit for the company. One can only surmise, but the mercenaries may be earning as much as $100,000 for a year on the job.
Compare that to the roughly $200 per month or $2400 per year that the Haitian National Police officers are receiving to put themselves on the line and face death every day. The roughly 400 Haitian Army soldiers deployed in the capital and facing the same dangers receive even less pay. That huge disparity for essentially the same work can only have a demoralizing effect on the Police and Army.
Both Haitian security forces and foreign contract security forces are using drones in an effort to target gang leaders. So far, they have not been successful, but innocent civilians have been killed in the process. If the foreigners kill innocent Haitians through drone attacks (or firefights), gangs will almost certainly use the casualties as propaganda to frame their struggle as a national liberation from foreign invaders to gain popular support. In any case, there will be little accountability for the actions of the mercenaries.
Meanwhile, the gangs themselves have attempted to purchase their own drones, most recently through the Dominican Republic. The DR has long served as a pipeline for arms to gangs in Haiti despite DR government efforts to stem the trade. Should the gangs in Port-au-Prince actually obtain drones and deploy them against Haitian police, army and foreign mercenaries, it will be a game changer and further redefine the nature of modern armed conflict, as it has in other parts of the world.
Some private security firms, including Mr. Prince’s, have reportedly attempted to hire Haitian-American military veterans to go to Haiti as security contractors/mercenaries to enhance familiarity with Haitian language and culture. But many Haitians with military skills have resisted being drawn in because they don’t want to be linked with notorious foreign mercenaries who are not welcomed and largely unaware of fast moving developments in Haiti. If anyone understands what’s going on with the gangs in Port-au-Prince, it’s the Haitian National Police and Army who face off with them almost every day.
Regardless, the mercenaries, along with the Kenyan and Jamaican troops currently deployed, won’t be enough to defeat the gangs, especially if the gangs are able to employ attack drones against them. The gangs already possess powerful assault weapons that match what their opponents have.
The foreign private security companies will certainly make a lot of money from their mercenary services regardless of how the tide of the conflict swings. And, once again, Haiti will become a place for foreigners to generate cash off of Haiti’s misfortune.