
What could possibly go wrong in the Southern Caribbean?
The day of reckoning for Venezuela and the United States fast approaching! $40 billion in military assets and 15,000 sailors and Marines deployed to the Southern Caribbean appears not to have persuaded Venezuelan president/dictator Nicolás Maduro to step down. Nor has the blowing up of skiffs purportedly carrying narcotics somewhere (though not to the US). Nor have sanctions or the seizure of an oil tanker loaded with Venezuelan crude. Threats of airstrikes and even putting US troops “on land” have done nothing either to move the needle on regime change.
So how will this madness play out? The parallels to the run-up to the Iraq War reverberate almost a quarter century later. Here’s my take as a former DoD threat analyst.
Start with the premise that Trump has invested too much in this vanity adventure to just order the fleet to return home with nothing to show. In a still hazy foreign policy, Maduro would be forced out and somehow Venezuela’s democratic leaders would emerge from hiding and take the mantle of power while riding on a wave of simmering anti-Maduro sentiment.
American actions did appear to embolden the underground pro-democracy elements. They see a US pressure or even a direct intervention as their only chance to regain power in Venezuela. Last week Nobel Peace Prize winner Maria Corina Machado took a dangerous risk (along with others) to escape the country by boat to the island of Curaçao to the north. From there she traveled to Oslo to meet with the Nobel Peace Prize Committee that granted her the prize (accepted earlier by her daughter). Her Nobel Peace Prize and now freedom outside of Venezuela gives her a much larger platform to advocate for regime change and restoration of democracy with American help.
But there is no pro-democracy guerrilla movement in mountains to oppose the Venezuelan military. In fact, there is no organized group of freedom fighters with firepower that US could theoretically support clandestinely or openly. And despite all the bluster of troops “on land,” a couple of thousand Marines on the aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford won’t be able to topple an entrenched Maduro with heavy support from his generals and admirals. In fact, even a coup is unlikely from these top military leaders.
It is worth examining why the generals and admirals are so loyal to Maduro. There are at least 2000 generals and admirals in the Venezuelan army. Probably more. That top-heavy number comes to a ratio of about 1 general/flag officer to 75 soldiers or sailors in a military force of 150,000.
By comparison, the US has about 1 general/flag officer to 1400 soldiers or sailors commanding a force of 1.3 million. (And even that is a bit top-heavy due to “rank-creep.”) Why the disproportionate ratio in Venezuela? Because Maduro has cleverly promoted these men to prestigious and powerful command positions to ensure more loyalty. Most of them are directly involved in and profiting off of major businesses in Venezuela. In other words, serious corruption and therefore a strong motivation to maintain the status quo. Oppose Maduro, and you will lose your lucrative criminal enterprise and probably your life.
The Venezuelan army also loosely controls a slew of pro-Maduro para-military groups known as Colectivos. Should the democratic opposition come out of hiding, the Colectivos, little more than gangs, could be counted on to viciously suppress them even though a majority of Venezuelans support a return to democracy.
That said, pressuring Maduro, the worst human rights abuser in the Americas, to step down is not wrong. Just like toppling Saddam Hussein was not morally wrong.
US hubris and search for quick solutions tend to set in motion unintended consequences that make things far worse. Regime change in Venezuela would be even harder than Iraq and lock the US into another forever-war and nation-building trying to fix the broken pieces. But that has not slowed down the Trump administration’s obsession with of replacing the current government with a more pro-American one (commitment to human rights optional).
It appears that the US is in the advanced “mission creep” stage where strikes on skiffs and tanker seizures are just not producing the results desired. That’s when military leaders typically call for more resources and wider latitude to neutralize the enemy or at least show tangible gains. In this case, the call may be for more combat ready troops to land and hold ground somewhere in Venezuela. But more resources to escalate the fight will not alleviate the Trump administration of its no-win position.
On the one hand, the large US presence and actions in the Southern Caribbean compels action to save face and show that Americans don’t back down to anti-American tinhorn dictators . On the other hand, the uncertainty of success and risk of catastrophic failure demands restraint.
The US would have a hard time controlling the country even if they threw in 50,000 troops with massive logistical backing. Still, Trump might wake up in the middle of the night in a moment of insanity and decide to invade on a whim because “national security” (and his ego) demands it. Or maybe he will need a distraction from a particularly bad news cycle. Though less likely than other scenarios, we cannot rule out him setting in motion a cascading disaster that would tear both Venezuela and the US apart. One can only hope that American general/flag officers would step in and say “No!” even if it meant the end of their careers.
The only viable options open to Trump at this point are to bomb Maduro out of power or negotiate with him.
Let’s look at the first option. If Maduro is killed, captured, or flees into exile, senior commanders would take over and rule by decree. Trump would have to negotiate with them. They might talk, but nothing would really change because they aren’t going to give up power or corrupt influence that generates wealth.
Now, there is a chance that without Maduro, the cohesive figure holding the generals together, might fray. In that case, we could see them fight each other over turf that would ultimately lead to a military version of gang warfare across the country. And that would almost certainly trigger a massive humanitarian crisis with millions more fleeing the country, along with the specter of famine and disease streaming in realtime for the world to watch. Oil production would come to a near halt. A bloody lawlessness would prevail even if some general managed to carve out enough control to claim authority to govern the country.
In this possible scenario, the transnational criminal gangs have the most to gain as they could set up hubs to ratchet up narcotics operations in South America and Caribbean islands, which until now have been minor. These gangs, working with generals and remnants of the Colectivos, would be in a position to ship far more drugs into the US. The irony is not lost.
The second option of Trump and Maduro negotiating may be more likely. Maduro knows he holds some high cards because of the extreme challenges of an American invasion, and that the clock is ticking in his favor. The US can’t linger off the coast of Venezuela forever. Maduro is quite aware that Trump is anxious for an out where he can show some kind of win that can be spun and sold to his base.
That’s when Maduro might throw a bone and agree to reduce shipments of oil to China and Cuba and sell more to the US. He could promise to clamp down on drug trafficking (the ostensible reason for US presence in the Southern Caribbean). And Maduro could toss in a contract for a big American oil company. (Trump likes business deals, especially if he or his family or cronies can benefit.) It would take a lot of spin, but Trump could declare victory of sorts and order the ships to sail away while promising to return if Venezuela does not comply. And Maduro could hang on to power with an iron fist.
Meanwhile, while this limited US incursion plays out, things can still veer wildly out of control and wreak havoc.
For example, the US ship-boarding team that seized the oil tanker “Skipper” last week puts the ship at greater risk of running aground or exploding if they don’t ensure that crews properly monitor operations. According to a tanker expert, this means maintaining the inert gas system to maintain a non-explosive atmosphere in the cargo tanks. That’s in addition to keeping the main engines and generators operational. If these fail, the ship is immediately in peril of an accident. This “vintage” (20+ years old) ship sailing under a false flag (Guyana) with an unknown call sign that may not have met scheduled maintenance inspections hardly inspires confidence.
But once the US team takes command of the ship, they are responsible, even if the capabilities of the crew and the ship itself are below standard. Complicating the matter further, a heavily laden very large crude carrier (VLCC) such as the “Skipper” differs significantly from US Navy or Coast Guard vessels. Therefore, a Navy or Coast Guard officer of the deck (OOD) placed in command of a VLCC will not know how to safely operate it unless he or she has had merchant marine training and experience.
Hopefully, the US has planned ahead for a seizure of one of the world’s largest crude tankers and can quickly insert the necessary nautical expertise. But so far all we have seen is dramatic video of a special operations team repelling on to the deck from a helicopter and taking over. Now what?
It’s not hard to imagine a nightmare accident that spills a couple of million barrels of crude oil into the Caribbean Sea and on to island beaches. Such a disaster would kill off tourism revenue and sink island economies. The clean-up and compensation costs to the US would be enormous. And the resentment sure to be stoked could turn some island-nations away from the US and induce them to cast their lot with US adversaries—setting in motion a whole new set of consequences for the region.








