More specifically, could well-armed gangs defy the local police force of other Caribbean island nations, take control, and rule like capricious, violent mobsters, as they have in Port-au-Prince? And more broadly, does gang success in Haiti’s capital foreshadow what might come beyond the Caribbean region, even the U.S.? Sounds like a stretch at first glance. After all, gangs in Port-au-Prince have become entrenched because Haiti has few law enforcement resources to fight back effectively. Moreover, Haiti, forever tagged as “the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere,” is constantly going through cycles of extreme political instability. If only the alarming developments in Port-au-Prince could be dismissed with the sentiment “can’t happen here.”

But what we are seeing unfold in Port-au-Prince–85% gang control over a city of 3 million people that may well reach 100% by the time you read this post–shows just how effective modern gangs can be. Especially when the city has long been in the throes of social and political polarization, distrust of authority, and breakdown of government services, including police protection. Add in the fact that gangs have a special appeal to large segments of young men who have no jobs, see no future, and desperate for status, power and money. None of this, of course, can hide the reality of gang brutality nor the pain of deep widespread trauma from the daily exposure to death.

As readers of my posts know, I attribute this trend primarily to a concept I call the “Democratization of Destruction.” Essentially, this means smaller groups with limited resources can challenge existing authority through the availability of more and more lethal weapons. The ability of gangs to acquire military grade arms effectively levels the playing field for criminal elements, especially when combined with a disenfranchised segment of the population living in poverty with little hope.

In the past, revolts against the government or taking control of territory would usually manifest in a civil war with the rebels being supplied with arms by outside countries. The current trend differs because the power and opportunity for defiance and control has devolved down to gangsters with high powered assault rifles–financed through drug and human trafficking, extortion, ransom, and possibly corrupt elite business or political figures seeking to benefit. The most visual and alarming expression gang power came when bullets blew through commercial aircraft fuselages and closed down the Port-au-Prince airport. If there was any doubt, those acts showed who has the upper hand.

An island nation with a strong police force along with an army can fight back and keep the gangs in check, if not defeat them outright. But not all island nations have this capability. And that gives criminal entities (and non state groups) a potentially decisive advantage as police take on far greater risks and casualties in shootouts or even full-fledged battles against gangs. Countering gang power becomes even more problematic when the local population affected does not assist law enforcement officers out of fear or distrust. Moreover, as we have seen in Port-au-Prince, police need to confront gangs in their shantytown neighborhoods, thus giving them a defensive advantage. Gangs have recruited or forced children to be lookouts for police as part of an intelligence network to give them advance warning. And, if the police do make progress against the gangs, the gangsters can lay low, confident that no one in the hood will dare reveal their whereabouts.

All this gives gangs the confidence to consolidate gains and expand for money and for ego. None of this is really new in the historical context. Sections of cities in other Caribbean nations and even U.S. cities have at various times come under the control or influence of criminal elements with similar modus operandi. With today’s advanced weapons in the hands of gangs, rooting them out becomes far more problematic.

Two weeks ago in Port-au-Prince, police tried to using drones in an attempt to kill gang leader Jimmy Cherizier, aka Barbecue, to regain the upper hand. But, while the police may have killed some of his gang lieutenants, they failed to take out the boss (despite initial claims of doing so). Apparently, the police did not have the intelligence to properly locate and identify him.

In response, Cherizier bragged about his survival in a broadcast and threatened to acquire his own drones to attack the police–thus using the same cutting edge arial weapons employed against him. Should that happen–a strong possibility–the level and sophistication of fighting will sharply escalate. Police will be at greater risk from gang drones than the gangs, because gangs know exactly where to find the police headquarters, depots, and vehicles. And gang drone strikes need not be limited to police. Police controlled districts and neighborhoods will be at risk as well, especially from Kamikaze type drone attacks almost impossible to detect or defend against.

Things are never static in gang vs government warfare. Gangs in Port-au-Prince are not just consolidating their power with weapons, but evolving to implement crude measures of governance, including safety of people under their control and access to food and medicine. At the same time, the gangs in Port-au-Prince have formed a loose alliance known as Viv Ansanm or “Live Together,” indicating a degree of political savvy and ability to move beyond gang-on-gang internal battles for turf dominance. Viv Ansanm has even begun recasting the image of gangs as a movement that stands for the “people” and Haitian nationalism against “foreign” influence. All in an attempt to gain some legitimacy and ultimately political recognition.

Bottom line: We should anticipate that Port-au-Prince gangs may well serve as a model for gangs in other Caribbean island nations and beyond. At the same time, we need to remember that the rest of Haiti outside the Port-au-Prince area is relatively safe. Gang power has its limits, even in Haiti. Next posting to detail gang tactics, expanding clout, and what can be done.

Painting by Malik Senefru