Postings - Ben Stubenberg

Taking Back Port-au-Prince

March 3, 2026 / Ben Stubenberg / 0 Comments

One town, one neighborhood at a time

Since President Jovenel Moïse was gunned down almost five years ago, gangs, have steadily tightened their grip on Port-au-Prince. Despite valiant efforts by the Haitian National Police and Armed Forces and the presence of foreign troops, gangs now control 90% of the city.

Moreover, gangs have consolidated their significant gains by forming alliances, the largest of which is Viv Ansanm (Live Together). They still ruthlessly exploit and enforce their will on the population under their control with the backing of elite Haitian businessmen. At the same time, the gang alliances have evolved to become players in the political arena. They now seek influence over future governance and even a measure of legitimacy. With newfound wealth from narcotics, human, and gun trafficking, along with extortion and kidnapping, the gangs have expanded power and leverage.

The impact of gang control is staggering. Gangs in Port-au-Prince killed 800 people in the first nine months of 2025. They caused the displacement of 1.4 million people–10% of Haiti’s population. Violence against women and girls escalated to 6000 cases in the first six months of 2025. 6.4 million people, more than half the population, currently needs humanitarian support. (International Rescue Committee/Watch Report January 2026)

Time for a new strategy to counter the domination of united gangs

The Haitian police and army have largely battled the gangs in their neighborhood strongholds from inside the capital. Sometimes the Haitian police and army force the gangs to retreat, but they seldom hold gang territory for long. The playbook needs to be flipped. Haitian police and army, along with foreign military support, need to start attacking gangs from outside the city and working their way in toward the center.

Until now, approaching gangs from outside the city would have been difficult. Only around 1000 Haitian police and army actively engage in combat against the gangs, together with some 1200 foreign troops in the city. But with the UN authorized (US supported) “Gang Suppression Force” numbering 5500, Haiti has an opportunity to try a different approach that presents a better chance of victory. The first contingent of the Gang Suppression Force arrives in April.

While the Gang Suppression Force is welcome news, it is imperative that these new foreign troops be used to augment and support Haitian police and army already fighting. Not the other way around. As noted in previous postings, the effort to crush gang control in Port-au-Prince must be led by Haitians. Historically, foreign forces have marched in with a “we know best” mentality that has sidelined Haitians, often resulting in ruinous outcomes. If that happens again, the Gang Suppression Force will fail.

No one can discount the deep complexities of gang influence and operational capabilities that often equal the police and army. But hitting the gangs in the towns and neighborhoods on the outskirts of Port-au-Prince where they have less control and thus more vulnerable has the best chance prevailing. For this approach to succeed, Haitian and foreign forces must develop and agree to a meticulous plan that lays out the tactics and follow-up step by step.

16 steps to defeat the gangs and take back control

Step 1. Set up a “Combined Command” Center where Haitian and foreign forces can plan and coordinate operations, collect and disseminate intelligence, and jointly evaluate success and setbacks

Step 2. ID towns and neighborhoods on the outskirts of Port-au-Prince to the north and east where gang influence and power is weakest. Prioritize engagement with gangs accordingly.

Step 3. Game out various scenarios to anticipate gang responses. Prepare countermeasures as well as logistical support requirements

Step 4. Advance incrementally on one town or neighborhood at a time using heavy firepower. Also use psychological operations to confuse and demoralize gang leaders

Step 5. Secure the town or neighborhood and immediately bring in food and medical aid, including trauma support. Open transport corridors, hospitals, schools, and markets that allow people to resume normal life as much as possible

Step 6. Publicize the success through social media when gangs are pushed out and highlight the benefits of gang removal.

Step 7. Advance to the next town or neighborhood deemed vulnerable and take with overwhelming force. Continue to rack up small but significant wins while pushing remaining gangs members deeper into the city until they are surrounded

Step 8. Detain and interrogate gang members captured. Give lower level gang members, often young teens forced to fight, amnesty and a second chance as appropriate. Prosecute the senior gang leaders, as well as anyone charged with committing violent crimes, and jail them if found guilty

Step 9. Establish a town and neighborhood councils with local leaders–after proper vetting–to resume municipal services assisted by aid organizations.

Step 10. Encourage people who have fled gang controlled areas to return so they can resume life with protection of Haitian and foreign forces. Provide assistance to ease the transition

Step 11. Give paying jobs to people to clean up liberated towns and neighborhoods along with micro loans for residents to restart businesses.

Step 12. Train a small security force of local residents to assist law enforcement with patrols and work with local council to keep gangs from returning

Step 13. Engage US Coast Guard and coast guard units from other nations to work with the Haitian Coast Guard to inspect all incoming ships for contraband. Ensure legitimate cargo offloaded is not delivered to gangs or elite allies

Step 14. Isolate gangs into smaller areas while offering inducements to surrender as Haitian and foreign forces move house to house to root them out

Step 15. Put in place monitoring systems (through the Combined Command) to quickly detect and respond to any reemerging gang activity

Step 16. Implement a longterm plan to recruit, train and equip 5000 – 10,000 additional Haitian police officers and army soldiers to replace the Gang Suppression Force and prevent gang resurgence in Port-au-Prince and other parts of Haiti

Recap

The best way to beat the gangs is to take back the towns and neighborhoods they currently hold, one at a time. Pick towns where gang strength is minimal for visible wins followed by immediate assistance for people. Gradually move toward the center of Port-au-Prince with the objective of squeezing gangs into submission.

A foreign Gang Suppression Force can give Haitian police and army the necessary firepower support to clear gangs from territory they control. But Haitian police and army must lead the way to build local confidence and encourage cooperation for longterm success that puts the nation on a path to recovery.

https://www.rescue.org/uk/article/haitis-gang-violence-crisis-what-know-and-how-help

Will Amped Up Foreign Forces Defeat The Gangs in Port-au-Prince?

February 20, 2026 / Ben Stubenberg / 0 Comments

Don’t bet on it!

The US and the UN appear to be getting serious about taking on the gangs of Port-au-Prince that have controlled 80-90% of the city for the past four years. But the influx of foreign troops authorized by the UN/US, now called the “Gang Suppression Force,” is going about it all wrong with another “we know best” mindset.

Notably, the Gang Suppression Force, which understands little about Haiti, will be taking the lead instead of the Haitian National Police and the Armed Forces of Haiti (Forces Armées d’Haiti).

The US and other nations in Caribbean region are right to be concerned about threats posed by transnational criminal elements operating in Haiti in concert with gangs. More narcotics, guns, and people are being trafficked through and from Haiti. However, foreign interventions in Haiti to change the power balance seldom end well.

Let’s cut to the chase and see what’s going on.

US Navy and Coast Guard ships show Up–To what end?

In early February, US Navy guided missile destroyer, USS Stockdale, and two US Coast Guard cutters, USCGC Stone and USCGC Diligence, arrived in the Bay of Port-au-Prince. According to the Haitian Times, the US Embassy confirmed that the ships had been operating in Haitian waters. Actually, everyone in Haiti, as well as the Haitian Diaspora, already knew the ships were patrolling off the coast thanks to the wide dissemination of photos. All of which prompted speculation about what the US was up to–especially following the US combat mission that extracted Venezuelan dictator/president Nicolás Maduro from office a month earlier.

Note: The ability of ordinary people to obtain and quickly disseminate imagery of just about anything reflects a long-term trend in the leveling of intelligence collection. Government intelligence agencies no longer have a monopoly on intelligence. Ordinary citizens with limited resources, as well as gangs, can get in on the game.

US officials described the deployment of the ships to Haiti as a deterrence and support mission, not a direct military intervention in Haiti. They stated, “The presence reflects the United States’ unwavering commitment to Haiti’s security, stability and a brighter future.” Stirring words but devoid of meaning and swathed in cliché. It is not at all clear what the ships could or would do to stop gang authority and violence while anchored in the harbor.

Indeed, the failure of the US Embassy to explain the mission to Haitian people (and make the case for a buy-in) only reinforces skepticism about the US government’s true intentions. The attitude assumes that Haitian people don’t need to know because “we’ve got this, not you.” And that lack of engagement with the people directly impacted goes to the heart of the problem. Especially in this golden age of social media where everyone sees and comments on everything.

If nothing else, the American gunboats showing up in the Bay of Port-au-Prince reaffirms the recent amped up US military posture in the Caribbean region. So, it is fair to ask: Is there another agenda beyond the stated “brighter future” for Haiti? Apparently, the continued deployment of 11 US warships, 150 aircraft, and 2200 Marines in the Southern Caribbean is not enough to take on the transnational criminals they are supposedly there to counter.

Gang Suppression Force–Who’s in charge?

The UN (with US co-sponsorship) authorization to deploy a 5500 man Gang Suppression Force will greatly expand the current foreign troop presence of about 1200. The vast majority on the ground now are Kenyan soldiers but also includes Guatemalans, Salvadorans, Jamaicans, Bahamians, and Belizeans. The first contingent of the Gang Suppression Force is expected to arrive on April 1. And then what?

Will the additional numbers for foreign troops be enough to push the gangs out and make Port-au-Prince safe again? They might make some temporary gains. But, if the foreign forces take the lead and leave the Haitians as subordinate, the gains will be temporary and failure assured.

Why is Haitian lead important? Because the perception of foreigners calling the shots waters down the legitimacy of the mission, especially when suspicions about ultimate aims run high. It displays an arrogance and disempowers the locals. Indeed, gang leaders have often sought to legitimize their role by casting themselves as “freedom fighters” who represent the people against foreign injustice. Foreigner troops blasting away in an effort to kill gang members–that inevitably kills civilians–helps to fuel that perception.

Austin Holmes, a Florida entrepreneur with extensive humanitarian and crisis management expertise in Haiti, testified before a Senate Appropriations Subcommittee hearing on Haiti’s security on February 12, 2026. In his testimony he argued for significantly greater investment in Haiti’s security apparatus and stated, “I think what’s important here for all of us is that Haitians are seen leading their security initiative.” Mr. Holmes has it right.

Unfortunately, the Gang Suppression Force seems intent on taking charge in fighting the gangs–even if foreigner leaders may claim to work as partners with Haitians. But the focus needs to be about Haitians fighting for Haitians. That’s what gives them credibility and support from the people–the essential factor for winning wars today. The Haitians have been in this fight for years and built up the expertise to understand the situation far better than the foreigners.

Haitian National Police at checkpoint in Port-au-Prince

Here’s how to make it work

Establish a “Combined Command” structure that puts Haitians in charge while leveraging the capabilities of the Gang Suppression Force. This way foreign military officers can jointly engage alongside Haitian National Police and Armed Forces officers to receive, analyze, and act on the same intelligence. Indeed, it is essential that everyone involved works from the same playbook. A Combined Command ensures that goal.

Of course, everything is complicated in Haiti, including charges of police corruption undermining effectiveness. But such charges must not distract from the courage shown by the vast majority of Haitian National Police officers, as well as Armed Forces, who risk their lives to confront the gangs every day. A Combined Command structure can serve to remedy concerns about corruption as well as enhance legitimacy because Haitian and foreign units will share a common operating picture. This includes creating accountability and shared ownership of outcomes.

At the same time, foreign governments need to commit to building up the numbers of the Haitian National Police and Armed Forces along with training and equipment. Henry Wooster, the Chargé D’affaires at the US Embassy in Port-au-Prince also testified before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee hearing on Haiti security. As reported in the Miami Herald, he said that while 12,000 armed people account for gang membership, about 3,000 “pose the greatest threat.” He added, “By contrast, the Haiti National Police has approximately 6,000 personnel on the books, of whom 400 or less do most of the fighting.” Clearly, a vast imbalance that must be corrected if there is to be any progress.

Also complicating matters are the wealthy Haitian elites who often support the gangs for their own gain. Their involvement and benefit must be identified and cut to take down the gangs.

Moreover, Haiti’s Transitional Presidential Council, the temporary government authority, lost its mandate to rule on February 7, 2026. That has left the country in a political vacuum, and no time-frame for elections has been set. Dire as this is, efforts to take down gangs cannot be suspended due to a barely functioning government.

Working through a Combined Command with additional manpower, the Haitian National Police and Armed Forces will have the best and perhaps only chance to crack the control of the gangs, open blocked corridors to the city, and liberate the people living in fear. This would allow the desperately needed aid to flow back, markets and clinics to reopen, and make Haiti safe enough to hold elections.

Kick out the mercenaries–They do more harm

Further aggravating the knotty mix of foreign and local forces in Port-au-Prince are some 200 mercenaries who have been on the ground since August 2025. They are mostly employed by Vectus Global, a private security company owned by American Erik Prince. That is the same Erik Prince who founded (and disbanded) the notorious security company Blackwater Worldwide, whose security team massacred 17 civilians in Iraq in 2007. As pointed out in an earlier post on this site, Vectus Global’s contract with the Haitian government for security services likely runs into the tens of millions of dollars.

Vectus Global’s mercenary services includes using “Kamikaze” drones to find and blow up gang leaders. But the drones–a cutting-edge weapon–have wreaked more havoc than produced meaningful results. Despite multiple efforts by police and mercenaries to take out Jimmy Chérizier (aka BBQ, leader of the gang alliance Viv Ansanm) by drones, he remains in power.

At the same Senate Appropriations Subcommittee hearing, Senator Chris Murphy (D-CT) stated that reports indicate that “an American company operating drone strikes inside of Haiti has killed 559 people and 11 children.” Indeed, Senator Murphy’s facts underscore the need to avoid civilian casualties, particularly as foreign forces increase. That also includes mitigating casualties among the many boys who are often pressured or forced to be lookouts or fight for the gangs, as human rights groups have pointed out.

Vectus Global’s contract needs to be terminated since their presence and sometimes heavy-handed actions only sustain the perception that foreigners do more harm than good.

Bottom Line

Give the Haitian National Police and Armed Forces the training and tools to lead the fight against the gangs with support from the Gang Suppression Force, not the other way around. And get rid of reckless mercenaries whose only goal is to get paid regardless of the consequences. Haiti still has a chance to crush the gangs controlling Port-au-Prince. Foreign forces can help achieve that goal–but only if they do it right.

Next post will outline a strategy to take back gang territory one neighborhood at a time.

Dominica Part II–Unexpected Encounter

January 7, 2026 / Ben Stubenberg / 0 Comments

Encounters with locals can pop up anytime when visiting Dominica. Perhaps with a fishermen on the beach back from the day’s catch. Or meeting an historian who will tell you about the indigenous Kalinago people on the island (also known as Carib Indians). Or hanging with locals knocking back an ice cold beer at a roadside bar at the end of the day. That’s how you really get to know any place. And, if you are lucky, those encounters will drift through your dreams long after you return home (and be worth more than the 300 iPhone pictures you take).

But sometimes you have an unexpected encounter that tells a larger story of what happening on the island.

While driving through the countryside with my host, we stopped briefly at small Chinese run variety store. The young Chinese lady behind the counter was efficiently moving the cash transactions along when she began speaking Chinese with a Chinese man who was buying something. A Dominican woman standing behind me sharply called out, “Why don’t you speak English? You are in an English speaking country!”

The Chinese lady shot back, “I’ll speak Chinese if I want to!” A short verbal exchange ensued, not words of anger, but more a clash between strong personalities determined to stand their ground. The two Chinese appeared to be recent entrepreneurial immigrants in Dominica (not Chinese government officials).

Without reading too much into a single incident, the minor spat gave a glimpse into a shifting social dynamic on the island and the larger Caribbean.

The Chinese lady should be able to speak her native language without being scolded. Indeed, cultural and linguistic diversity should be welcomed as they enrich and enliven society. But the Dominican woman may have been expressing an underlying worry about “others” edging in without respecting the dominant culture and integrating. (That umbrage manifests itself in just about every society. We certainly see it in North America and Europe.) And the Chinese lady herself could be venting her own frustration of not being accepted because of who she was. Clearly, both should have been more sensitive to the other.

The unfortunate bellowing displayed by these two individuals contrast sharply with Caribbean island societies, including Dominica. West Indians are traditionally very inclusive and accepting of outsiders who immigrate and identify themselves as nationals of the island where they live.

Indeed, ethnically Chinese people (and every other nationality or ethnic group) who have lived in the Caribbean for generations see themselves as West Indian first, even if most of their social interactions are within the same ethnic group. This admirable trait has benefited Caribbean nations in the same way it has benefited the US (until this past year at least when immigrants were made to feel unwelcome).

In Dominica, however, the new Chinese immigrants have arrived at the same time the country is visibly experiencing the takeover of much of its infrastructure by the Chinese government. Some projects, like a new hospital or more schools, can be seen as gestures of goodwill. Indeed, why should an economically struggling island-nation say “no” to those–even if the not-so-subtle effort is to extend influence?

But the Chinese mega projects point to a far more disquieting agenda.

The giant new airport being bulldozed into the jungle (noted in the previous posting), along with the special seaport about to be carved into a cove on the wild east coast, stand out. They come with their own large foreign workforce that has no interest in integrating into the country. They are there solely to construct, maintain, and manage what amounts to an extension of China’s overseas power.

These mega projects are way too large for Dominica’s needs, and everyone knows it. As a result, an unease about the future has permeated social discourse, as China appears poised to exert sway over Dominica’s future and chip away at its sovereignty. So, it is not surprising that China’s growing clout can spawn resentments and lead to divisions within society.

The mega projects compel Dominica and other Caribbean countries with a strong Chinese presence to ask: What exactly is China’s objective and what will we owe for all this “development?” More specifically, is the enormous new airport and adjacent seaport also going to serve as a base to park Chinese planes, ships, drones, radars, and other military equipment? If so, the build up will certainly be seen as a provocation by the US (regardless of administration) and place Dominica in a tenuous position caught between two superpowers.

In view of the forceful extraction of Venezuelan president/dictator Nicolás Maduro last week, these questions take on a more ominous and urgent significance as a sense of foreboding sweeps over Caribbean islands.

In fact, the American incursion into Venezuela, together with the build-up of military force in the Caribbean writ-large, may push island nations like Dominica to make uncomfortable choices sooner rather than later. The stark options come with a huge risk of sharper fractures exacerbated by the spillover effect from Venezuela. Any decision could easily open the door to more internal conflicts within islands and risk further political instability.

While Trump’s confrontation with Maduro and now his removal from power may have slashed Chinese influence in Venezuela–especially access to oil–the strife may have enhanced the Chinese foray into Caribbean islands. A free gift from their arch adversary!

Rightly or wrongly, just about every Caribbean islander I have spoken with perceives the US actions in Venezuela as “bullying” and asks “Could we be next?”

Trump’s unilateral exercise of raw military power to take out Maduro with little pushback in the US seems to have overshadowed the brutal repression instigated by the Maduro regime.

That’s a sharp turn from the traditional close ties between the US and Caribbean islands over decades. Indeed, Caribbean island nations have long had strong connections and affinities with the US (notwithstanding periodic regime changing invasions since the late 1890s). Certainly far more than China, which is culturally and politically much different.

As those bonds with the US fray, the new boy on the block, China, will reap the benefits while also sowing its own divisive seeds. Chinese imperious and high-handed actions could well trigger a backlash on a national and personal level as played out at the variety store confrontation I witnessed last month. It gets complicated. But the US, a country that should be a natural ally and friend of the Caribbean, is losing out.

Bottom Line: Woefully misguided actions by the US and unconstrained Chinese power projections in the Caribbean can only heighten tensions and lead to confrontations that could easily spin out of control.

Dominica–Must See Island!

December 25, 2025 / Ben Stubenberg / 0 Comments

I just came back from a trip to Dominica last week visiting an old friend there. When I lived in the US Virgin Islands, I used to fly into Melville Hall Airport on the northeast coast–always a hairy landing skimming the tops of coconut trees on approach. Glad to say that the airport has been significantly upgraded and now welcomes commercial airline jets from the US. But even though it’s much easier to get to Dominica these days and the island is “on the map,” the place remains a world apart–mind-blowing wild beauty that, except for a few small towns, not much different than what Columbus saw when he sailed by in 1493.

I stayed in Dos D’Ane village surrounded by high mountains of green jungle between the airport and the town of Portsmouth on the west coast. The name means “back of the donkey.” Not sure why the village is called that, but it’s about as tranquil as it gets. To get there or anywhere in Dominica, prep yourself for some serious switchback mountain roads that somehow everyone there knows how to navigate. (Luckily, I wasn’t driving.) The roads are mostly pretty well-paved, though not very wide. But what really catches the eye is the extensive beautification along the roads all over the country. I mean gorgeous plants lining the streets and not one bit of litter. The people and government are totally committed to retaining the ecological wonderland that it is.

Food, as you might imagine, grows everywhere in the rich soil. People who have more than they need from the garden give it away. No one goes hungry in Dominica. Some houses are ramshackle but most are modest structures and well-maintained. A few high-end fancy resorts appear here and there but they are small.

Beaches? Mainly rocks and grey or black sand. This is a volcanic island after all. While the beaches don’t invite much swimming like the Turks & Caicos, they still mesmerize the senses. Along with the jagged coast of jungle with mist sweeping down from the high peaks. And the waterfalls, rivers, and small lakes, cold and hot. In Dominica, a sense of adventure greets you at every turn as do the wonderfully friendly people. Everyone is genuine and helpful. And if you meet tourists visiting from anywhere, you will surely share a spirit of being in a magical place.

Being the political junkie that I am, I took close look at the ubiquitous Chinese government presence on Dominica. Projects everywhere! Hospitals, schools, and friendship centers all with signs in English letters and Chinese characters. The biggest project of all is a massive airport under construction just a couple of miles north of the current airport. Huge trucks carrying rock and dirt run 24 hours a day, I’m told. Cranes and bulldozers clear away giant swaths of jungle. But a brand new airport clearly is not needed since the current one with its small terminal handles all the flights just fine.

Now plans are afoot to build a giant port right next to the new airport, ostensibly to bring in all the construction material so the Chinese don’t have to truck it across the island from the capital Roseau. OK, but a whole new port just to support the airport? All of which begs the question, what’s really going on?

Actually, Chinese presence all over the Caribbean is growing with no end in sight. Why? Influence, UN votes, radar stations, maybe even bases are likely all on the agenda in view of proximity to the US. I should add that Trump’s saber rattling over Venezuela and recent ban on granting travel visas to Dominicans has turned many here against the US government. An that has no doubt made the Chinese presence easier to accept. Troubling since US and Dominica have always been natural allies along with the rest of the Caribbean islands. But that tradition is fast disappearing as the Chinese pour in economic development while the US shows off with a fleet of big gunboats. Watch this space for updates.

US & Venezuela On The Brink

December 14, 2025 / Ben Stubenberg / 2 Comments

What could possibly go wrong in the Southern Caribbean?

The day of reckoning for Venezuela and the United States fast approaching! $40 billion in military assets and 15,000 sailors and Marines deployed to the Southern Caribbean appears not to have persuaded Venezuelan president/dictator Nicolás Maduro to step down. Nor has the blowing up of skiffs purportedly carrying narcotics somewhere (though not to the US). Nor have sanctions or the seizure of an oil tanker loaded with Venezuelan crude. Threats of airstrikes and even putting US troops “on land” have done nothing either to move the needle on regime change.

So how will this madness play out? The parallels to the run-up to the Iraq War reverberate almost a quarter century later. Here’s my take as a former DoD threat analyst.

Start with the premise that Trump has invested too much in this vanity adventure to just order the fleet to return home with nothing to show. In a still hazy foreign policy, Maduro would be forced out and somehow Venezuela’s democratic leaders would emerge from hiding and take the mantle of power while riding on a wave of simmering anti-Maduro sentiment.

American actions did appear to embolden the underground pro-democracy elements. They see a US pressure or even a direct intervention as their only chance to regain power in Venezuela. Last week Nobel Peace Prize winner Maria Corina Machado took a dangerous risk (along with others) to escape the country by boat to the island of Curaçao to the north. From there she traveled to Oslo to meet with the Nobel Peace Prize Committee that granted her the prize (accepted earlier by her daughter). Her Nobel Peace Prize and now freedom outside of Venezuela gives her a much larger platform to advocate for regime change and restoration of democracy with American help.

But there is no pro-democracy guerrilla movement in mountains to oppose the Venezuelan military. In fact, there is no organized group of freedom fighters with firepower that US could theoretically support clandestinely or openly. And despite all the bluster of troops “on land,” a couple of thousand Marines on the aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford won’t be able to topple an entrenched Maduro with heavy support from his generals and admirals. In fact, even a coup is unlikely from these top military leaders.

It is worth examining why the generals and admirals are so loyal to Maduro. There are at least 2000 generals and admirals in the Venezuelan army. Probably more. That top-heavy number comes to a ratio of about 1 general/flag officer to 75 soldiers or sailors in a military force of 150,000.

By comparison, the US has about 1 general/flag officer to 1400 soldiers or sailors commanding a force of 1.3 million. (And even that is a bit top-heavy due to “rank-creep.”) Why the disproportionate ratio in Venezuela? Because Maduro has cleverly promoted these men to prestigious and powerful command positions to ensure more loyalty. Most of them are directly involved in and profiting off of major businesses in Venezuela. In other words, serious corruption and therefore a strong motivation to maintain the status quo. Oppose Maduro, and you will lose your lucrative criminal enterprise and probably your life.

The Venezuelan army also loosely controls a slew of pro-Maduro para-military groups known as Colectivos. Should the democratic opposition come out of hiding, the Colectivos, little more than gangs, could be counted on to viciously suppress them even though a majority of Venezuelans support a return to democracy.

In view of the human rights abuses by the Venezuelan government, the worst in the Americas, pressuring Maduro to step down is not wrong. Just like toppling Saddam Hussein was not morally wrong.

The problem lies in the dubious rationales and reckless implementation that inevitably lead to massive cost in blood and treasure.

US hubris and search for quick solutions tend to set in motion unintended consequences that make things far worse. Regime change in Venezuela would be even harder than Iraq and lock the US into another forever-war and nation-building trying to fix the broken pieces. But that has not slowed down the Trump administration’s obsession with of replacing the current government with a more pro-American one.

It appears that the US is in the advanced “mission creep” stage where strikes on skiffs and tanker seizures are just not producing the results desired. That’s when military leaders typically call for more resources and wider latitude to neutralize the enemy or at least show tangible gains. In this case, the call may be for more combat ready troops to land and hold ground somewhere in Venezuela. But more resources to escalate the fight will not alleviate the Trump administration of its no-win position.

On the one hand, the large US presence and actions in the Southern Caribbean compels action to save face and show that Americans don’t back down to anti-American tinhorn dictators . On the other hand, the uncertainty of success and risk of catastrophic failure demands restraint.

The US would have a hard time controlling the country even if they threw in 50,000 troops with massive logistical backing. Still, Trump might wake up in the middle of the night in a moment of insanity and decide to invade on a whim because “national security” (and his ego) demands it. Or maybe he will need a distraction from a particularly bad news cycle. Though less likely than other scenarios, we cannot rule out him setting in motion a cascading disaster that would tear both Venezuela and the US apart. One can only hope that American general/flag officers would step in and say “No!” even if it meant the end of their careers.

The only viable options open to Trump at this point are to bomb Maduro out of power or negotiate with him.

Let’s look at the first option. If Maduro is killed, captured, or flees into exile, senior commanders would take over and rule by decree. Trump would have to negotiate with them. They might talk, but nothing would really change because they aren’t going to give up power or corrupt influence that generates wealth.

Now, there is a chance that without Maduro, the cohesive figure holding the generals together, might fray. In that case, we could see them fight each other over turf that would ultimately lead to a military version of gang warfare across the country. And that would almost certainly trigger a massive humanitarian crisis with millions more fleeing the country, along with the specter of famine and disease streaming in realtime for the world to watch. Oil production would come to a near halt. A bloody lawlessness would prevail even if some general managed to carve out enough control to claim authority to govern the country.

In this possible scenario, the transnational criminal gangs have the most to gain as they could set up hubs to ratchet up narcotics operations in South America and Caribbean islands, which until now have been minor. These gangs, working with generals and remnants of the Colectivos, would be in a position to ship far more drugs into the US. The irony is not lost.

The second option of Trump and Maduro negotiating may be more likely. Maduro knows he holds some high cards because of the extreme challenges of an American invasion, and that the clock is ticking in his favor. The US can’t linger off the coast of Venezuela forever. Maduro is quite aware that Trump is anxious for an out where he can show some kind of win that can be spun and sold to his base.

That’s when Maduro might throw a bone and agree to reduce shipments of oil to China and Cuba and sell more to the US. He could promise to clamp down on drug trafficking (the ostensible reason for US presence in the Southern Caribbean). And Maduro could toss in a contract for a big American oil company. (Trump likes business deals, especially if he or his family or cronies can benefit.) It would take a lot of spin, but Trump could declare victory of sorts and order the ships to sail away while threatening to return if Venezuela does not comply. And Maduro could hang on to power and continue to rule with an iron fist.

Meanwhile, while this limited US incursion plays out, things can still veer wildly out of control and wreak havoc.

For example, the US ship-boarding team that seized the oil tanker “Skipper” last week puts the ship at greater risk of running aground or exploding if they don’t ensure that crews properly monitor operations. According to a tanker expert, this means maintaining the inert gas system to maintain a non-explosive atmosphere in the cargo tanks. That’s in addition to keeping the main engines and generators operational. If these fail, the ship is immediately in peril of an accident. This “vintage” (20+ years old) ship sailing under a false flag (Guyana) with an unknown call sign that may not have met scheduled maintenance inspections hardly inspires confidence.

But once the US team takes command of the ship, they are responsible, even if the capabilities of the crew and the ship itself are below standard. Complicating the matter further, a heavily laden very large crude carrier (VLCC) such as the “Skipper” differs significantly from US Navy or Coast Guard vessels. Therefore, a Navy or Coast Guard officer of the deck (OOD) placed in command of a VLCC will not know how to safely operate it unless he or she has had merchant marine training and experience.

Hopefully, the US has planned ahead for a seizure of one of the world’s largest crude tankers and can quickly insert the necessary nautical expertise. But so far, all we have seen is dramatic video of a special operations team repelling on to the deck from a helicopter and taking over. Now what?

It’s not hard to imagine a nightmare accident that spills a couple of million barrels of crude oil into the Caribbean Sea that sloshes on to island beaches. Such a disaster would kill off tourism revenue and sink island economies. The clean-up and compensation costs to the US would be enormous. And the resentment sure to be stoked could turn some island-nations away from the US and induce them to cast their lot with US adversaries—setting in motion a whole new set of consequences for the region.

US Ratchets Up Caribbean Presence

December 1, 2025 / Ben Stubenberg / 0 Comments

The U.S. Navy destroyer USS Gravely (DDG-107) approaches Port of Spain, Trinidad

As the US military saber rattling escalates against Venezuela, including closing the country’s airspace, the US is pushing Caribbean island-nations for greater security cooperation. Notably, US Department of Defense officials have been holding high level talks with Trinidad & Tobago and the Dominican Republic to provide access to military bases, ports and airports.

The American pitch is framed as a larger partnership strategy to counter narcotics trafficking through the Caribbean. But these anti-drug trafficking overtures cannot be separated from the prospect of forcing regime change in Venezuela. All of which is looking more like a grandiose US geopolitical game plan for the region with hazy the objectives.

It is plausible that drug traffickers might be changing their modus operandi by applying high tech methods to better conceal their boats and using different routes to reach the US. And this should compel a more aggressive US response. However, details of a more sophisticated drug trafficking threat have not been presented or openly discussed. If drug traffickers really are shifting their tactics and upping their game, then why is the response confined to blowing up open skiffs powered by outboard motors off the coast of Venezuela (along with boats off Central America on the Pacific side) ?

Are these skiffs just easy pickings to allow some visible “wins” (or cheap thrills) for the flotilla gathered in the Southern Caribbean? If so, it begs the question: Why can’t the biggest and most lethal armed force the world locate and intercept the dangerous boats supposedly sneaking their way north up the chain of islands? The capture of just one high-tech boat with crew intact (not stupidly blowing it up and killing everyone) could go a long way to show the serious threat of drug trafficking across Caribbean waters. And certainly more believable than blasting away small boats off the Venezuelan coast alleged to be carrying drugs but never proven.

Without more evidence of drug trafficking from boats, high-tech or otherwise, the over-arching justification for massive American military presence smacks of the “weapons of mass destruction” claim that propelled the US into Iraq almost a quarter century ago. The current US claims may well cause some island-nation leaders to wonder just what they are being asked to sign up for and the price. And what is the bigger American agenda?

Now, an expanded American engagement with the Caribbean could be a good thing and become a force-multiplier. Not just to help counter drug trafficking but also gun smuggling, human trafficking, and transnational crime generally throughout the region. American initiatives could also pave the way for more cooperation to beef up Caribbean armed forces to combat gangs, particularly in Haiti, but also on other islands. Enhanced collaboration could also be combined with investment incentives, trade barrier reductions, and disease eradication programs to further strengthen institutions and goodwill. A robust and symbiotic American presence comes with the added bonus of keeping adversaries like China, Russia and China at bay.

Instead, the current proposed partnership appears to be limited to using Caribbean islands for expanded American military presence. That raises suspicions among Caribbean people and their leaders, as they are all too familiar with American troops occupying island-nations and dictating terms since the early 1900s. Moreover, it invokes the long legacy of colonial rule that resides deep in the Caribbean heart.

Current negotiations with Caribbean governments might be limited to conducting US operations in national air space and territorial waters, as well as parking spots for planes, ships, and radars. Intelligence sharing is also likely part of the package. But all that will raise concerns about sovereignty and strings attached. It’s a delicate balancing act for the island-nations that lends itself to pragmatism. But greater confidence and assertiveness among Caribbean countries and a wariness about the costs vs benefits could temper US ambitions. If there is going to be amped up cooperation, Caribbean island-nations will want to bargain as equals, not junior associates.

Indeed, questions about American intentions regarding regional engagement may have become more concerning by the troubling revelations in the Washington Post on Nov 28, 2025. The article states that after the first skiff off Venezuela was hit with eleven people on board in September, two people miraculously survived. It is unclear whether Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, who was watching the first strike, gave the order to kill two survivors clinging to the smoldering wreck or if he just said “kill the all.” Regardless, Admiral Frank “Mitch” Bradley, Special Operations Command, gave the direct order to blow up the last two survivors as well. Unreleased video of the survivors purportedly shows them desperately clinging to debris and trying to overturn the severely damaged boat for 41 minutes.

There is no justification for killing people on a boat, even a suspected drug boat, that does not pose a threat. Killing survivors struggling in the water is even more heinous and clearly a war-crime by any US or international legal standard (spelled out in the Geneva Convention) and possibly murder. That heinous act, if proven true, thus presents another dilemma for Caribbean leaders: Do they want to align themselves with a US leadership that so callously disregards human life> Especially when the only ones killed are on the lowest rung on the drug trafficking ladder, the desperate ones trying to make a few hundred dollars for driving a boat?

The Trump administration’s bellicosity and lawlessness today may well cause some Caribbean countries to back away from American cooperation, even with the US dangling partnership enticements. That erosion of trust and unravelling of American goodwill could turn parts of the Caribbean against the US and leave the region more fractured, impoverished, and unstable.

On a personal note, as a longtime Caribbean observer and resident, it deeply pains me to see my country spiraling downward and erasing the qualities that once defined it as a force for good in the world, however imperfect. That said, I am confident that Trump’s pigheaded and toxic approach to the Caribbean, and just about everything else this administration touches, will change. Stay tuned for a post-Trump era for the region could look like.

Southern Caribbean–What Next?

November 24, 2025 / Ben Stubenberg / 0 Comments

USS Gerald R. Ford

Time to draw upon my years in Department of Defense and weigh in on the massive US military buildup in the Caribbean and potential conflict with Venezuela.

First, let’s dispense with the “stopping the flow of drugs into the US” the “narcoterrorism” labels as justification. The drug flow from Venezuela into the US is relatively minimal compared to Mexico and Colombia. And blowing up small skiffs that may or may not have drugs and killing everyone smacks of extra-judicial killings and likely a warcrime. And that in turn puts US military personnel in grim quandary about what exactly they should or should not be doing.

Moreover, drone attacks that kill those on board is plain stupid and counterproductive. That’s because those on board could have been taken into custody and interrogated. From them the US could learn the modus operandi, production locations, transport hubs, and drug lords directing the enterprise. It’s called basic intelligence collection and could yield a great deal of information that would actually matter in the war on drugs–if that was the aim. And, by the way, the drugs could be seized and shown off to the world as evidence. But none of that is happening.

So what else is going on? Tragically, it’s more about hubris–the notion that the US can force regime change with military might, settle scores, and show them who’s boss. Most of the time, that does not work out well, especially when it comes to bigger countries. Think Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan. Venezuela is a large country with high mountains, dense jungles, and around 30 million people, most of them hungry and hurting. The risks of failure are huge. In the past half century, the US has tended to win the battles, but lose the wars in the big countries. That’s mainly because American people don’t like the massive price tag in blood and treasure that comes later for wars that marginally matter to US security. Moreover, the powers in charge of winning–flag officers and senior intelligence officers–have displayed little interest in grasping the complex cultural, historical, political, and sociological elements that define a country and what the US is up against.

(Caveat: Elite US Special Forces and a few intelligence officers do immerse themselves in the country the US attacks or intervenes. They take the time to learn what’s happening on the ground and how it fits into the larger picture. But their often insightful observations are seldom acted upon.)

Now, this is not to say that Americans are wrong to want to depose despots who torture and kill opponents while aligning themselves with other oppressive despots. No democratic, law-abiding country should turn a blind eye to governments who commit atrocities. Venezuela’s “President” Nicolás Maduro falls into this category. He blatantly stole the 2024 presidential election and forced the opposition to flee or go into hiding. Notably, his popular opponent Marina Corina Machado won the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize for her courage. Maduro and his henchmen’s crimes against humanity, including torture and disappearances, are the worst in the Americas. Shed no tears if he gets ousted.

The problem is that American motives in this case are not rooted in liberation and human rights but rather an ill-advised power play to assert greater dominance in the region by force. By ramping up lethal forces in the Southern Caribbean, the US has placed itself in a no-win situation that will not end well. Trump has invested too much in this misadventure to back down now. Especially after designating Maduro and his government allies as members of the so-called foreign terrorist organization Cartel de los Soles (Cartel of the Suns). More than a dozen warships, including the world’s largest aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald R. Ford, with 70 fighter jets and 2200 Marines on board, have been deployed. Most are hovering off the coast of Venezuela. In addition, numerous bombers and surveillance aircraft have been moved to the region and are flying patrols along Venezuela’s territorial waters.

This sets up a stand-off with one of two possible outcomes: Maduro steps down–an unlikely scenario–or the US strikes at targets in Venezuela. Trump is not going to leave without some kind of “win” to brag about. The unknown is what targets the US will hit. The US could bomb a few Venezuelan military bases and maybe some drug production facilities hidden in the jungle, declare victory, and go home. But Maduro could also declare victory, claiming the Americans dared not do more. And he would still be in power.

That raises the specter of going after Maduro himself and “finishing the job.” That possible scenario would trigger a free-for-all in Venezuela that would almost certainly plunge the country into a calamitous conflict. Perhaps an all-out civil war with various factions vying for power, including ambitious generals. The opposition movement to Maduro would come out of hiding and claim its mantle as the legitimate rulers, perhaps in alliance with one of the military factions.

And then there are the criminal gangs, some affiliated with the military, who would simply move in and stake out their territory. In fact, I would lay bets on ruthless gangs coming out on top since they already have powerful weapons, a stream of cash, and an established infrastructure. Once ensconced, they will be hard to dislodge and turn the fragile country into a series of warring criminal fiefdoms. Venezuela will be a state in name only.

Of course, a Venezuela thrown into chaos would not just strengthen the hold of drug trafficking gangs, but lead to widespread famine, disease, and violence that could also trigger another wave of fleeing refugees. Moreover, Venezuela’s crisis could spill over into other Caribbean countries, many of them already fragile and vulnerable, with unknown consequences. America has built up goodwill and soft power over decades of cooperation in the Caribbean. This includes cooperation with the US Coast Guard to counter narcotics and human trafficking, as well as substantial disaster assistance among other initiatives. Also, Miami is widely seen as a commercial and, to some extent, a cultural capital of the Americas where ideas and people can mix and thrive freely. But a US strike against Venezuela–with videos of civilian carnage–could well spark sympathy and solidarity with a besieged Venezuela and foment anti-American sentiment. The instability generated in Venezuela and Caribbean islands would almost certainly embolden US adversaries to go from a toe-hold to a foot-hold in the region.

In short, Trump’s US military incursion will create exactly the opposite of its intended effect by weakening US national security and leaving a lasting legacy of anguish and suffering that Americans will all pay for–heavily, again. As I write this, news outlets report on possible talks between Trump and Maduro and speculation on a diplomatic solution. I’m skeptical, but here’s one scenario: Maduro promises to stop narcotics trafficking from Venezuela that Trump can call a win, however meager. Given Trump’s susceptibility to flattery, inclination to switch positions, and suddenly cave after tough talk, Maduro has chance to call off the dogs and remain a tyrant.

Stay tuned for next posting: Envisioning a post-Trump Caribbean region that rethinks everything.

The Dire Plight of Stateless Children in Turks & Caicos

July 19, 2025 / Ben Stubenberg / 0 Comments

By Ben Stubenberg

As published in The Turks & Caicos Sun E-paper July 11 and 18, 2025

Who are they?

They live among us in the shadows and in plain sight. We might see them holding their mother’s hand while waiting along the highway for a jitney ride. Or shooting baskets at the court. Or walking from church in their Sunday best. They don’t seem any different than most other children living here, except for one thing: They have no identity. These are the stateless boys and girls of the Turks & Caicos who float through the perilous underbelly of our society, vulnerable and without hope.

Almost all of the stateless children were born in TCI, grew up here, and may or may not have attended school. Some may have only a birth certificate, but many have no documents at all. And so, officially, do not exist. This means that as they mature into teenagers, they cannot work or get a driver’s license or enroll in national health insurance. They cannot open a bank account or be issued a passport to travel.

These children likely number in the thousands. A US Department of Labor study published in 2014 estimated that TCI had around 2000 stateless children. In 2025, we can only surmise there are more.

Their misfortune is not some faraway problem. In fact, they live little more than a stone’s throw from upscale resorts and our own homes. Just follow the dirt trail that turns off from the highway and disappears into the brush and you’ll come upon their homes—a patchwork of ramshackle hovels on the fringes of a settlement. Usually their abodes have no running water or electricity, but each hidden hamlet might have its own informal mayor, sheriff, stores, bars, lookouts, and “dealers” who act as powerbrokers for the powerless.

Cut off from all opportunity, the stateless, like the thousands of undocumented migrants in TCI, struggle to survive—always fearful that they too will be discovered, that someone will rat them out. And that makes them prime targets for recruitment into local gangs who will give them things society does not—money, food, shelter, a sense of belonging. And maybe a gun.

This should not be happening. The stateless have rights, including the right to nationality of the country where they were born when they have no other. Leaving them without nationality, and the protections that status affords, runs counter to all international and domestic law. Their plight may ultimately compel the courts to step in and give them the status they are entitled to. Meanwhile, it’s time to shine a bright light on what’s going on and what can be done.

How it begins

In nearby countries wracked by extreme poverty or gang violence or both, the word has long been out that a better life awaits in the TCI with its swanky hotels, well-off tourists, and dollars to be made. The great majority who set their sights on TCI live in Haiti, just 100 or so miles (160 km) due south.

They are driven by dreams and desperation, even with overwhelming odds stacked against them. But if they can make it to these shores, the hope is to land a job that earns them enough money to survive and send what’s left to relatives in need back home.

To embark on the journey to TCI from Haiti, each passenger will pay human traffickers $2000 to $3000 upfront. The price depends on whether the boat has a motor or just a sail. Few Haitians in Haiti can afford that kind of money, so they rely on friends and relatives abroad to wire the funds through a financial services company.

On the designated night, the daring voyagers, mostly men but some women, and even toddlers, gather nervously at a remote beach or small village along Haiti’s north coast. Many will be carrying with them a grigris, a Voudou talisman to protect them. As added insurance, a Voudou priest performs a ceremony praying for a safe voyage. 100 or 200 people then say farewell and pack into a sloop less than 30 ft long.

Traffickers might have made all kinds of promises about safely reaching TCI, but everyone on board is keenly aware they may not see tomorrow. Crossing the open ocean on a boat with gunwales barely two feet above the water line is fraught with peril. Sometimes the boat capsizes, drowning everyone. Sometimes the boat is spotted by drones or coastal radar and intercepted by TCI Marine Police off the coast. But sometimes the migrants are lucky enough to evade surveillance, steer through shallow coral reefs, and land on a beach on Provo before sunrise.

When their feet touch the sand, they scramble into the bush to hide. If the migrant has made this trip before, deported, and returned for a second or third time, they may be able to call someone to pick them up. But more often the migrants run out of food and water and furtively emerge along the road listening for someone who speaks Kreyòl so they can ask for help. The local Haitians already here will usually spot them first by their ragged condition and give them a ride to the shrouded migrant communities in Dock Yard, Five Cays, or Blue Hills.

The new “home” for the migrants might be a tiny room they share with others Or it might be a camp in the bush where they sleep under a tarp. From there they meet the dealers who can find them work on the down-low. Gardening, housework, bartending, or construction. Anything. But it’s never that simple.

The dealer may demand a cut of what the migrant makes and the employer may pay far less than the minimum wage because who is going to complain? And that subjects the migrants to exploitation, abuse, and the threat of being revealed to law enforcement. In those circumstances, women are especially defenseless. Some women might find a partner to look after them. Some band together for protection and share what little money they earn or food left behind by tourists. Others might be forced provide sex to remain hidden. Unaware of their rights, none apply for asylum.

When the women become pregnant, a new set of trials confronts them starting with the lack of access to medical services. A few good doctors, midwives, and nurses on TCI volunteer to provide some pre-natal care without charge. But mostly the women are on their own to struggle as the pregnancy advances. When they go into labor, a stark choice confronts them: Give birth on the dirty floor of a squalid bush “clinic” hidden deep in the shantytown. Or take a chance, come out from hiding, and check into the hospital.

The Birth Certificate Hurdle

The hospital is mandated to take in and treat anyone who has an emergency, including women about to give birth, regardless of financial condition. And they do. But the undocumented migrant woman dropped off at the emergency entrance by a jitney after her water has broken never has health insurance. So, after the birth, but prior to discharge, the hospital presents the new mother with a bill for hundreds if not thousands of dollars. Of course, she cannot pay, but the debt remains outstanding.

The hospital issues the new mother an “It’s a boy” or “It’s a girl” birth confirmation card. The mother must present that card to apply for a birth certificate through the TCI Registrar’s Office. But she must also provide other documents, including—crucially—a passport, though other forms of government ID are often accepted.

Few of the mothers who arrived in TCI as migrants from Haiti have a passport or any documentation. Sometimes that leads them to buy a forged document through the thriving underground fake-ID market that preys on anyone without legal status. But government officials almost always spot the fakes which prevents them from issuing a birth certificate. Using a fraudulent document is a criminal offense that compounds the mother’s already precarious situation.

Sometimes the mother will opt to pay someone with legal status to pretend to be the parent in order to secure the birth certificate. Again, government officials are alert to this kind of fraud and double check with the hospital.

And then there is the ever-present fear factor that someone will call Immigration to send her and her baby back to Haiti. Although neither the hospital nor Registrar’s Office report their cases to Immigration, the deportation perception is there and that holds back mothers from taking the risk. And that leads to some women opting to give birth in the bush where there is no record of birth or any “proof” the child was born here or anywhere. For those children, the game is already up the minute they exit the womb.

Even in cases where the mother overcomes her fears, provides all the documents, and is granted a birth certificate, the child still has no status to remain in TCI. The birth certificate only allows the child to enroll in school.The child is still stateless even though it lists the mother’s nationality. Years, down the road, a TCI birth certificate might offer the child a slim chance to obtain TCI nationality but only if more hurdles can be cleared.

The Nationality Hitch

TCI government officials argue that no child in TCI is stateless because the child derives citizenship from the mother. So, from the government perspective, if the mother is Haitian, the child is Haitian. However, the law rendering nationality does not work that way.

A mother or father of a child may theoretically pass on their nationality, but only if they take steps to register the child with their country of citizenship at an embassy or consulate or through the government department in the home country. Only national officials with authority can actually issue a passport or some certificate that certifies nationality.

(For countries that offer birthright citizenship, a child can quickly acquire full citizenship status in the country. The US—for now, Canada, and most countries in the Americas fall into this category. Neither TCI nor UK, however, have birthright citizenship.)

In contrast to children born in TCI to migrant parents without status, the children born here to parents with legal status, such as a work permit, typically register the children as citizens of their home country soon after birth. And from there they can be issued a passport confirming their nationality. Crucially, children of parents with legal status are added to the work permit or other status card as a family member. In that way the children are allowed to be in TCI as long as a parent holds legal permit to be here (up to the age of 18).

Of course, the children of migrants here with no status have no way to provide their child with any similar permission to be in TCI. At first, their children grow up unaware of any difference. At times they may interact with other kids their age who do have legal status. It might be a soccer match or a birthday party that, for an hour or so, suspends and blurs the divide between their two worlds. But soon enough, harsh reality intrudes. The stateless children learn their place, as they are set apart in most fundamental, discriminatory, and sorrowful way from other kids born here to foreign parents, as well as TCI citizens.

The one possible pathway for a child without a nationality to gain status in TCI is to apply for a British Overseas Territory Citizenship (BOTC). The Department of Citizenship and Naturalization in the Ministry of Home Affairs processes BOTC applications using guidance set forth in the British Nationality Act of 1981. But the BOTC procedure for children whose parents do not have legal status (through Section 15(4)) imposes its own severe and stringent requirement: The child must have lived in TCI for 10 years to be eligible to submit an application.

In addition, a parent must supply a birth certificate, medical records, and letters showing the child has attended schools. A parent must also provide evidence of their own nationality, such as a passport or government ID. And the parent must once more set aside the fear that all the information provided on the application will not be used to find and deport them during the process.

In short, the child in this situation is left to live in limbo for a full decade with no nationality or right to be here before having even a chance at BOTC status. During that decade, they too may be subject to deportation when Immigration discovers the undocumented mother. When that happens, a mother will sometimes make an agonizing choice and deny that the child in the house is hers.

The mother reasons that her child, even with no status, is better off staying in TCI than going with her to Haiti, a country where the child has never been. In such cases, Social Services is often called in to place the child with foster parents who are paid to give care. Meanwhile, the mother deported back to Haiti has little chance of seeing her child for years.

In the rare instances when the child manages to meet all the conditions for BOTC status and granted a certificate, that status only applies to the child. Should the mother be detained by Immigration, she would again be forced to make the same choice between taking the child with her back to her home country or leaving the child in TCI.

Can this heart-wrenching problem be fixed? It can. UN Conventions protecting the rights of the stateless, particularly with regard to children, and the TCI Constitution itself offer a remedy. But that will probably require an undocumented parent of a stateless child to come forward and file suit against the government at the risk of being deported.

Securing Rights

The stateless children (and adults), do in fact have well-defined human rights, including the right to a nationality. These rights are set forth by UN Declarations, Conventions, Protocols, and Covenants adopted over the past 75 years. Moreover, the TCI Constitution itself also offers many human rights protections that can be applied to convey status to those who have none.

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Gutierrez, succinctly articulated the scope of the problem that in many ways mirrors the situation experienced by stateless children in TCI:

“Destitution, detention, lack of access to health care or education, the impossibility of marrying a loved one or registering the birth of a child. These are just some of the many problems faced by stateless people around the world, especially when their existence is ignored and their basic human rights are denied.”

It is worth a brief review of the UN instruments designed to protect stateless children from a bleak life described by UN High Commissioner Gutierrez. These UN protections are not mere aspirational goals but treaties which obligate contracting nations (aka signatory countries) to follow and implement through domestic law, including the granting of nationality. Indeed, the UK ratified the UN instruments, in whole or in part, and extended the application to the British Overseas Territories, including TCI.

The UN 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons which provides the basic framework for the protection of stateless persons. It obligates the signatory nations to facilitate assimilation and naturalization of stateless persons who fall under the definition, “not considered a national by any state under operation of its law.”

The 1961 Convention Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness which requires signatory countries to take additional steps to actively reduce statelessness in their territories. Article 1 states, “A Contracting State shall grant its nationality to a person born in its territory who would otherwise be stateless.”

The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) which further strengthens both the 1954 and 1961 UN Conventions to end statelessness as it applies to children. Article 7(2) of the CRC mandates specific acts to ensure that every child has a nationality, including requiring that “The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth…to acquire a nationality.”

The TCI Constitution itself aligns with UN international and UK domestic law and, through its provisions, can be cited as authority for giving TCI nationality to the stateless. Notably, the TCI Constitution extends protections to all persons without distinction. These constitutional protections explicitly entitle all persons to a fair hearing, equality before the law, free movement without arbitrary expulsion, an education for children, and not be subjected to inhuman treatment.

Section 16 of the TCI Constitution in particular states that “no person shall be treated in a discriminatory manner by any person acting by virtue of any law in the performance of the functions of any public office or any public authority.” Under the TCI Constitution, discriminatory means “affording different treatment to different persons attributable wholly or mainly to their respective descriptions such as by …national or social origin,…association with a national minority,…birth or other status…”

The key word here is “discriminatory,” and that applies to all persons regardless of status. By prohibiting discrimination based on birth or other status per Section 16, the Constitution makes plain that children without status or nationality should not be treated differently than anyone with status or nationality.

The Way Forward

In sum, the various TCI Constitutional protections, taken together or separately, obligates the country to grant stateless children born in TCI the same rights as everyone else—including TCI nationality when they have no other citizenship.

That obligation to “regularize” the stateless through the TCI Constitution, as well as UN international law, has yet to be tested in TCI courts. Any suit brought on behalf of one or more stateless litigants would certainly cite the long 10 year period for waiting for a chance to be put on a path for nationality. Nobody, especially a child, should be left to linger like this.

The complex documentation requirements would also likely be argued as overly burdensome because they effectively hinder successful applications. Before any case can be brought, however, an undocumented parent would have to feel confident that filing a suit on behalf of their child would not trigger a deportation response from Immigration. That prospect may be the biggest hurdle.

But it should not be necessary to wait for a litigant with a stateless child to ask the court to enforce a basic human right. Laws and regulations can be rewritten by TCI’s House of Assembly to bring the country in line with its Constitution as well as international obligations.

The bureaucratic structure to process claims already exists in TCI to quickly determine statelessness and to grant of nationality for children born here without encumbrances. And any process should ensure that no parent need be afraid to register their child out of fear of being deported.

What other choice is there? To continue to ignore the stateless children who will grow into adulthood with no chance to participate in society? To relegate these children to the squalor of back alleys—vulnerable, exploited, and ever-fearful of being discovered? To deny them the most basic rights, an education, health care, and legal status to be here simply because they had the misfortune of being born in TCI to a mother who arrived without the proper papers?

What we do or don’t do as a society to bring the stateless children out of the shadows will be a reflection of our own principles and commitment to human rights. In this case, the laws are clear, as is the moral imperative.

Ben Stubenberg is a Caribbean writer living in TCI. His articles and commentaries about TCI, Haiti, and other islands can be found on his website benstubenberg.com.

Clearing Away Paradise

July 8, 2025 / Ben Stubenberg / 0 Comments

As many readers know, I have long and loudly called attention to dangers of overdevelopment that are destroying the once valuable currency of Provo–a low-key destination sought out by high-end visitors.

In recent years we have seen the completion of a once unthinkable 12 story hotel and the near completion of another. That’s in addition of dozens of other developments all over Providenciales (Provo). The unsightliness, the congestion, the loss of identity have taken a high toll. Notably, the clearing for new construction projects has also cleared away natives species of trees and plants, as well as birds, which is the topic of my latest article in Times of the Islands. https://www.timespub.tc/2025/07/clearing-away-paradise/

Read and weep because we are quickly destroying our heritage, in addition to a precious resource, as we descend from high-end tourism to mass tourism. In short, this is a lose-lose runaway car that seems to have no brakes. A classic short-term gain type of thinking that will hit islanders the hardest, especially when Provo becomes a bargain destination that fails to keep bringing in the revenue to sustain a the services it currently enjoys. And make no mistake, everyone in TCI will see their standard of living decline.

The Evolving Fight To Contain Gangs in Port-au-Prince

June 14, 2025 / Ben Stubenberg / 0 Comments

In a desperate attempt to stave off complete gang takeover of Port-au-Prince, the Interim Haitian Government has contracted with private foreign security forces. These well-armed, occasionally well-trained, and often reckless hired guns are supposed to support the Haitian National Police and Army. But it is unlikely they will be able to contain the gangs or save the government’s tenuous toe-hold on less than 10% of the capital. The foreign private security forces may actually exacerbate the problem.

The most recent addition to the private security providers is Erik Prince, founder of the notorious Blackwater Worldwide private military contracting company that massacred 17 civilians in Iraq in 2007. Blackwater was dissolved, but rebranded itself under a new company, Constellis, offering similar services.

According to the New York Times, Mr. Prince is sending 150 “mercenaries” to Haiti. The dollar amount for the contract is not known, but it is likely in the tens of millions in order to pay the mercenaries and their equipment for their stint in Port-au-Prince, as well as ensure a healthy profit for the company. One can only surmise, but the mercenaries may be earning as much as $100,000 for a year on the job.

Compare that to the roughly $200 per month or $2400 per year that the Haitian National Police officers are receiving to put themselves on the line and face death every day. The roughly 400 Haitian Army soldiers deployed in the capital and facing the same dangers receive even less pay. That huge disparity for essentially the same work can only have a demoralizing effect on the Police and Army.

Both Haitian security forces and foreign contract security forces are using drones in an effort to target gang leaders. So far, they have not been successful, but innocent civilians have been killed in the process. If the foreigners kill innocent Haitians through drone attacks (or firefights), gangs will almost certainly use the casualties as propaganda to frame their struggle as a national liberation from foreign invaders to gain popular support. In any case, there will be little accountability for the actions of the mercenaries.

Meanwhile, the gangs themselves have attempted to purchase their own drones, most recently through the Dominican Republic. The DR has long served as a pipeline for arms to gangs in Haiti despite DR government efforts to stem the trade. Should the gangs in Port-au-Prince actually obtain drones and deploy them against Haitian police, army and foreign mercenaries, it will be a game changer and further redefine the nature of modern armed conflict, as it has in other parts of the world.

Some private security firms, including Mr. Prince’s, have reportedly attempted to hire Haitian-American military veterans to go to Haiti as security contractors/mercenaries to enhance familiarity with Haitian language and culture. But many Haitians with military skills have resisted being drawn in because they don’t want to be linked with notorious foreign mercenaries who are not welcomed and largely unaware of fast moving developments in Haiti. If anyone understands what’s going on with the gangs in Port-au-Prince, it’s the Haitian National Police and Army who face off with them almost every day.

Regardless, the mercenaries, along with the Kenyan and Jamaican troops currently deployed, won’t be enough to defeat the gangs, especially if the gangs are able to employ attack drones against them. The gangs already possess powerful assault weapons that match what their opponents have.

The foreign private security companies will certainly make a lot of money from their mercenary services regardless of how the tide of the conflict swings. And, once again, Haiti will become a place for foreigners to generate cash off of Haiti’s misfortune.